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Liquidity — a characteristic 
of a well-functioning market — refers 
to the ability to trade easily and cost-
lessly. In liquid markets, investors 
should be able to execute their trades 
immediately – or nearly so — without 
incurring significant transaction costs. 
This should be true for small trades as 
well as large ones.
In practice, trading involves 
some costs; that is, markets are not 
perfectly liquid. In this article, I will 
describe some of these costs and 
outline some of the ways in which ex-
changes can increase liquidity. Then 
I will discuss results from my recent 
working paper. In particular, I will 
show that liquid markets in which 
transaction costs are very low can raise 
a new sort of contractual problem: 
When an individual can easily find 
trading partners, he can promise the 
same commodity to multiple coun-
terparties and subsequently default.  I 
will also discuss two ways to overcome 
this contractual problem: The first is 
through collateralized trade; the sec-
ond is through a very simple type of an 
exchange with a very minimal role.
HOW DEALERS CAN
PROVIDE LIQUIDITY 
When you want to sell an as-
set (for example, a share of stock), you 
need to find an individual who wants 
to buy that asset.  One option is to wait 
until such an individual arrives, then 
trade directly with him. Another op-
tion is to sell the asset to a dealer who 
will later sell the asset to that other 
individual. This second option allows 
you to execute your desired trade im-
mediately.
Dealers help provide liquidity 
by being ready to buy and sell when-
iquidity is a desirable feature of a
well-functioning market. In this article,
Yaron Leitner explains how exchanges
can provide liquidity. He also discusses
his recent research, which explains some contractual 
problems that may arise in very liquid markets, as
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ever the market is open. In other 
words, they make a market, and that’s 
why they are also called market mak-
ers. Dealers can operate on an orga-
nized exchange, such as the New York 
Stock Exchange, or over the counter 
– a term that refers to a decentral-
ized trade that does not occur on 
an organized exchange. Each dealer 
quotes two prices: a bid price and an 
ask price. The bid is the price at which 
the dealer is willing to buy an asset, 
and the ask is the price at which he is 
willing to sell the asset. The dealer can 
revise either price at any time, and the 
difference between them (ask minus 
bid) is called the bid-ask spread. For 
example, suppose the dealer thinks 
the true value of the asset is $100. To 
make a profit, he can quote an ask 
price that is higher than $100, say 
$102, and a bid price that is lower than 
$100, say, $99. This leads to a positive 
bid-ask spread of $3. 
A large bid-ask spread may 
represent profits for the dealer, but it 
imposes costs on the individuals who 
buy from and sell to the dealer. In con-
trast, a low bid-ask spread means there 
are almost no transaction costs from 
trading. Thus, the bid-ask spread is one 
measure of how liquid a market is: The 
smaller the spread, the more liquid the 
market because the transaction costs 
of each trade are smaller.
A positive bid-ask spread does 
not necessarily mean that the dealer 
makes a profit because, as in any busi-
ness, there are costs involved in being 
a dealer. In addition to the standard 
costs (for example, the dealer’s time, 
setting up a telecommunication net-
work, and so forth), economists have 16   Q1  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q1  2004   17 www.phil.frb.org
suggested two additional costs: the cost 
of holding inventories and the cost of 
asymmetric information.
Cost of Holding
Inventories. To perform his job — that 
is, to buy and sell upon demand — a 
dealer needs to hold some shares of the 
stock in which he makes a market.1 In 
other words, he needs to hold an in-
ventory of the stock. (This distinguish-
es a dealer from a broker, who does not 
buy or sell stocks on his own account 
and whose only role is to match buyers 
with sellers.) After he buys shares from 
an individual who wants to sell, the 
dealer needs to hold these shares until 
another individual who wants to buy 
arrives. This imposes some risk on the 
dealer. In particular, the dealer might 
lose money if the stock’s value drops. 
Of course, any individual who holds 
stocks takes some risk. The main dif-
ference between the dealer and other 
individuals is that the dealer does not 
have full discretion in choosing the 
amount of shares he holds. He buys 
and sells in order to satisfy other indi-
viduals’ needs. For example, a dealer 
might be forced to sell a particular 
stock at a time when the price is low 
because of a large buildup of buy or-
ders. To compensate him for the fact 
that the amount of shares he holds may 
subject him to more risk than he would 
choose on his own, he needs to charge 
fees. Otherwise, being a dealer would 
be unprofitable.2 
Cost of Asymmetric 
Information. Sometimes an individual 
may have access to information 
before it is made public. Such an 
individual is called an informed trader 
or an informed investor. His private 
information may be important in 
determining the value of an asset. 
For example, after discussions with 
a technology firm’s engineers, an 
industry analyst may conclude that 
a new computer system is likely 
to be highly successful. Since this 
information is not publicly available to 
all traders, we can think of this analyst 
as an informed trader.3 An informed 
trader can benefit from his private 
information. If he thinks, based on his 
information, the price of the stock will 
rise, he will buy shares of that stock 
(and if he is correct, the price will 
eventually rise). Similarly, if he thinks 
the price is about to fall, he will sell. In 
other words, an informed trader buys 
assets that are underpriced and sells 
those that are overpriced.
Now think about the dealer 
who stands ready to buy and sell. The 
dealer cannot distinguish between 
those who have private information 
and those who are buying or selling 
shares for other reasons, such as 
rebalancing a portfolio or financing 
the purchase of a house. But he 
knows that, on average, he loses 
money when he closes a deal with 
an informed investor.4   Remember, 
informed traders sell when they believe 
a stock is overpriced and buy when 
they believe it is underpriced. This 
means that, on average, the dealer is 
buying overvalued stocks and selling 
undervalued stocks, surely a recipe 
for losing money. To make up for this 
loss, the dealer needs to make a profit 
when he trades with those who are not 
informed, and the way to do that is to 
set a positive bid-ask spread.  In other 
words, when there are individuals who 
have information superior to that of 
the dealer, a positive bid-ask spread 
does not necessarily mean that the 
dealer makes a profit.5
MARKET STRUCTURE
AND LIQUIDITY
Market structure varies 
across different dealer markets. Since 
different market designs may have 
different effects on liquidity, one may 
ask which market design provides 
traders with the most liquidity. As we 
will see, the answer is not that obvious, 
even if we limit ourselves to structures 
that are relatively simple. 
Thomas Ho and Hans Stoll 
showed that competition among 
dealers can lead to a more liquid 
market in which individuals face lower 
transaction costs. The basic idea is 
that if a dealer quotes fees that are 
1 The discussion that follows refers to dealers on 
a stock market, but the ideas apply to dealers in 
other markets, for example, currency markets, 
futures markets, options markets, and so forth.
2 To see how a monopolist dealer (that is, a 
dealer who faces no competition from other 
dealers) optimally sets his bid and ask prices 
taking into account the costs of holding his 
inventory, read the 1981 article by Thomas 
Ho and Hans Stoll. Another interesting 
article is the one by Yakov Amihud and Haim 
Mendelson, who studied the behavior of a 
monopolist dealer who faces a constraint on the 
maximum number of shares he can hold.
4 The idea that a dealer may trade with 
individuals who have superior information is 
an example of what economists call an adverse 
selection problem.
5 In their article, Lawrence Glosten and 
Lawrence Harris provide some empirical 
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that 
a significant amount of the New York Stock 
Exchange common stock spreads are due to 
asymmetric information.
Since different market 
designs may have 
different effects on 
liquidity, one may ask 
which market design 
provides traders with 
the most liquidity. 
3 Certain types of trading based on superior 
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have much flexibility in setting their 
bid-ask spreads — they always quote 
the lowest fees they can. In addition, 
each dealer needs to make sure that he 
does not lose money on any individual 
trade because if he does, he cannot 
make up for his losses later. Thus, each 
dealer quotes prices so as to break even 
on each trade. In other words, each 
dealer expects to make zero profit on 
each trade. In contrast, a monopolist 
market maker can sometimes set 






lose money, because he can make up 
for his losses later.
To see why a monopolist 
market maker can provide a more 
liquid market, consider a period in 
which the potential for information-
based trade is very high, for example, 
the period in which a firm is 
considering a merger.7 Competing 
market makers may need to set very 
high bid-ask spreads to compensate for 
the money lost to informed investors. 
This, however, may make trading 
very costly for all individuals (both 
informed and uninformed), who, in 
extreme situations, may simply choose 
not to trade. The result is that the 
too high, he loses customers to other 
dealers who quote prices based on 
their true costs. 
In Ho and Stoll’s model, all 
individuals have the same information 
regarding the value of the stock, so 
there are no informed investors to 
worry about. Dealers, however, take 
into account the costs of holding 
inventories. These costs may be 
different across dealers and may vary 
when the levels of their inventories 
vary. In particular, the dealer with 
the largest inventory may be under 
pressure to quote the best (that is, the 
lowest) ask price because he wants 
to get rid of his inventory, and the 
dealer with the lowest inventory 
can quote the best (that 
is, the highest) bid price.  
Interestingly, competition can 
lead to a more liquid market, but it 
does not necessarily imply that dealers 
just break even. The reason is that the 
dealer who can quote the best price 
does not need to quote prices based on 
his true costs. He only needs to match 
his nearest competitor’s fee.6   
In contrast, Lawrence 
Glosten suggests that in some cases, 
a monopolist dealer, who faces no 
competition from other dealers, may 
actually provide more liquidity than 
competing market makers. Glosten’s 
model applies to specialists on the 
New York Stock Exchange, where 
each specialist is the only one who 
has access to the order book, listing 
buy and sell orders for a particular 
stock. Glosten ignores the costs of 
inventories and emphasizes the cost 
of asymmetric information. In his 
theoretical model, when dealers 
compete with one another, they don’t 
6 An interesting implication of Ho and Stoll’s 
model, consistent with evidence provided 
by Oliver Hansch, Narayan Naik, and S. 
Viswanathan, is that the behavior of each dealer 
depends not only on his own inventory but also 
on the inventories of other dealers. 
7 If a firm is contemplating a merger, it may be 
very difficult for it to keep information from 
leaking to some investors for whom trading is 
not illegal.
8 Limit orders are price-contingent orders to sell 
if the price rises above or to buy if the price falls 
below a prespecified price.
market essentially shuts down until 
the relative number of better informed 
to less informed investors declines, 
perhaps because the firm announces 
that it will merge. 
A monopolist dealer can also 
set a very high bid-ask spread, thereby 
preventing any trade from happening, 
but he need not do so. By setting a 
lower spread, he induces individuals 
to trade, so that some of the private 
information is revealed through price 
movements. (For example, the rising 
price of a firm’s stock may indicate 
that investors have information 
that the firm will be 
purchased by another.) 
This reduces the cost of 
asymmetric information, 
thereby making subsequent 
trades more profitable. For 
example, suppose that to break 
even the dealer needs to set an ask 
price of $110 if the potential for 
information-based trade is high and 
$100 if the potential for information-
based trade is low. Unlike competitive 
dealers, who must set a price of $110 in 
the first case and $100 in the second 
case, a monopolist dealer can quote 
a price of $107 in both cases. In the 
first case, he will lose money ($3 per 
trade), but he will make it up in the 
second case, in which he will gain $7 
per trade.
In practice, market structures 
are usually more complex, so the 
choice is not just between one dealer 
or many dealers who compete with one 
another. For example, the specialist 
on the New York Stock Exchange has 
some monopoly power, but he also 
faces competition from individuals who 
submit limit orders.8 (For example, if 
an individual wants to buy shares if 18   Q1  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q1  2004   19 www.phil.frb.org
the price falls below $50 per share, the 
specialist will be able to buy only if he 
quotes a bid price higher than $50.) In 
addition, the choice may become even 
more difficult because different types 
of investors may prefer different market 
structures. For example, Duane Seppi 
showed that it is possible that given 
the choice between a hybrid specialist/
limit order market (like the New York 
Stock Exchange) and a pure limit 
order market (like the Paris Bourse), 
small retail and large institutional 
investors would prefer the first market, 
while some mid-size investors would  
prefer the second.
LIQUIDITY AND STRATEGIC 
DEFAULT
Contracting with Bialystock 
and Bloom. Up to this point, we 
have focused on the role of dealers in 
providing liquidity, that is, making 
trade easier and less costly. But when 
transaction costs are very low (that 
is, markets are very liquid), a new sort 
of contractual problem may arise. 
In particular, when it is very easy to 
find trading partners, an individual 
can promise the same commodity 
to multiple counterparties and 
subsequently default.9
The risk of default exists 
whenever an individual promises to 
pay or deliver cash or some other 
commodity in the future. For example, 
when I give you a loan, I face the 
risk that you will not pay me back. 
Similarly, when you and I enter a 
forward contract according to which 
in some cases I pay you (for example, 
if the dollar appreciates against the 
yen next month), and in other cases, 
you pay me (if the dollar depreciates 
against the yen next month), both of 
us face the risk that the other one will 
not pay what he promised. 
An individual may default 
simply because he does not have the 
asset he’s supposed to deliver. This 
can be either because of bad luck or 
because the individual did not make 
enough effort to ensure that he would 
have the cash or the asset for delivery. 
But default can also be strategic, that 
is, deliberate. In particular, when 
penalties are not harsh enough, an 
individual may default even when he 
has the asset he needs to deliver. 
Liquid markets can 
exacerbate the problem of strategic 
default by making trading too easy. 
When an individual can easily find 
partners to trade with, he may have 
greater temptation and opportunity 
to promise the same asset to multiple 
counterparties and subsequently 
default. The inability to credibly 
pledge an asset or cash to one and 
only one party (or, more generally, 
the inability to engage in contractual 
relationships with one and only one 
party) is called nonexclusivity.10  For 
example, in a forward market (a 
market where individuals enter forward 
contracts), nonexclusivity could induce 
individuals to promise too much 
relative to their resources, thereby 
creating liabilities that might exceed 
their income.
When an individual can 
enter only one contract, a punishment 
such as losing his reputation or losing 
future trading partners can induce 
him not to default. But when he can 
enter multiple contracts, losing one’s 
reputation or even going to prison may 
not be a big enough threat to ensure 
performance because the potential 
gain from cheating can be very large.  
The following dialogue from the movie 
(and Broadway hit) “The Producers” 
illustrates this:
•  Bloom: “If he were certain that 
the show would fail, a man could 
make a fortune...If you were really 
a bold criminal, you could have 
raised a million dollars, put on a 
$60,000 flop, and kept the rest.”
•  Bialystock: “But what if the play 
was a hit?”
•  Bloom: “Well, then you’d go to 
jail...Once the play is a hit, you’d 
have to pay up all the backers, 
and with so many backers, there 
could never be enough profits to 
go around.”
The threat of default because 
of nonexclusivity can make everyone 
worse off. Individuals may simply be 
afraid to trade with one another when 
they expect their contracting partners 
to default. In my working paper I 
suggest two mechanisms for enforcing 
exclusivity: collateralized trade and an 
exchange. 
Collateralized Trade 
Enforces Exclusivity… Exchanges 
often require that individuals put up 
some collateral in the form of cash 
or other financial securities, such as 
stocks and bonds. (These are referred 
to as margins.) Over-the-counter 
trades often require collateral, too.
We often think of the direct 
effect of collateral on reducing strategic 
default: Since you lose the collateral, 
you have less to gain from defaulting. 
But collateral also has an indirect 
effect: Since individuals have limited 
resources, collateral requirements limit 
the number of bilateral contracts they 
can sign. (We are assuming that in 
pledging the collateral, the individual 
gives it over to a third party for safe 
keeping — like an escrow account — 
which limits his ability to pledge the 
10 To learn more about some recent work that 
emphasizes nonexclusivity as a contractual 
problem, read my working paper as well as the 
articles by Alberto Bisin and Adriano Rampini; 
David Bizer and Peter DeMarzo; Charles Kahn 
and Dilip Mookherjee; and Christine Parlour 
and Uday Rajan.
9 The discussion that follows applies to 
individuals as well as to dealers who trade 
among themselves in the so-called inter-dealer 
market. Dealers often do so to balance their 
portfolios. 20   Q1  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q1  2004   21 www.phil.frb.org
same collateral for multiple contracts.) 
This, in turn, limits the potential 
gains from a strategy of signing lots 
of contracts and defaulting on all 
of them. In other words, collateral 
requirements help achieve exclusivity. 
As we have seen, with exclusivity, 
existing punishments (for example, 
losing future trading partners) become 
more effective in reducing strategic 
default. Therefore, an individual 
may credibly promise to repay more 
than the amount of cash he posts as 
collateral.
…But Collateral Is Costly. 
While it is true that collateral can 
reduce default, collateral also has 
economic costs. Probably the most 
important of these costs is that 
the cash posted as collateral could 
have been invested elsewhere, for 
example, in some promising project. 
Economists refer to this type of cost 
— the opportunities forgone — as 
an opportunity cost. In other words, 
posting cash as collateral is costly 
because individuals could have made 
better use of the cash.
While the opportunity 
cost of collateral is likely to be more 
significant, there are also out-of-pocket 
costs involved in posting collateral, 
such as the legal costs of establishing 
clear rights of ownership and the 
monitoring costs of safekeeping the 
collateral to ensure it is not used for 
other purposes. The bottom line is that 
although collateral requirements can 
enforce exclusivity — thereby reducing 
strategic default — this may be too 
costly a solution. 
CREATING AN EXCHANGE TO 
ENFORCE EXCLUSIVITY
Another way to control for 
the fact that individuals may make too 
many trades relative to their capital 
is to set up an exchange that imposes 
limits (called position limits) on the 
number of contracts individuals can 
enter.11  Interestingly, to carry out 
its role of enforcing exclusivity, the 
exchange does not need to play other 
roles many real world exchanges play, 
such as matching buyers and sellers, 
acting as a dealer, or guaranteeing 
performance in the event of default. 
The exchange in my research paper 
is simply an institution to which pairs 
of individuals can report the fact that 
they have entered a bilateral contract. 
Even though its only role is to set limits 
on the number of contracts individuals 
can report, it can make everybody 
better off.12
Clearly, if everyone obeyed 
the position limits set by the exchange, 
the problem of nonexclusivity would 
not arise and everybody would be 
better off. But how can the exchange 
make sure that everyone obeys these 
limits? While it may be easy for the 
exchange to monitor the number of 
contracts individuals enter through 
the exchange, it may be difficult and 
sometimes even impossible to monitor 
contracts that individuals may choose 
to enter off the exchange. 
Reporting Trades May Be 
Voluntary. One of the main results in 
my working paper is that the exchange 
can enforce exclusivity, even if it can 
monitor only the contracts individuals 
choose to enter through the exchange. 
In fact, individuals will choose to let 
the exchange know about all their 
trades, even if they do not have to and 
even if there is some small fee involved 
in doing that.
Why would this be so? Keep 
in mind that when you and I agree not 
to report a trade, I’m not the only one 
keeping a secret from the exchange – 
so are you. By not letting the exchange 
know that you and I have signed a 
contract, I give you the opportunity to 
enter more contracts than permitted 
by the position limits. For example, if 
the position limit is three, and I agree 
to enter a contract with you without 
reporting it to the exchange, you now 
have the opportunity to enter a total 
of four contracts. But your incentive 
to default deliberately on all your 
contracts – including the one you have 
signed with me – is greater when you 
can sign four contracts rather than 
three. This is because in my model 
the potential benefit if you don’t need 
to deliver on any of your contracts is 
unlimited (and gets higher the more 
contracts you enter), but the potential 
loss if you do need to deliver is limited 
because of individuals’ limited liability 
(that is, you lose the same amount of 
cash whether you enter three contracts 
or four). Therefore, to prevent your 
11 There are other reasons why real-world 
exchanges impose position limits. For example, 
position limits are sometimes intended to 
prevent investors from manipulating prices.
12 Of course, this does not mean that other 
roles are less important. It simply means 
that the role of enforcing exclusivity can be 
analyzed separately. Real-world exchanges 
almost universally carry out more than one 
function. However, it is often helpful to 
think about the minimal conditions for an 
institution — like an exchange — to be useful. 
This is one of the motivations for my working 
paper. Understanding the logical foundations 
of an exchange (as well as other financial 
institutions) may be important in addressing 
some practical questions, such as what the 
effect of competition among exchanges is or 
whether exchanges should be regulated.
Even though its
only role is to 
set limits on the 
number of contracts 
individuals can report, 
[an exchange] can 
make everybody 
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default, I will insist on reporting our 
trade to the exchange.13 
Position Limits Need Not 
Be Binding. Surprisingly, to make 
sure that individuals do not have the 
incentive to cheat by not letting the 
exchange know about some of their 
off-exchange trades, the exchange 
may need to set position limits that 
are nonbinding. For example, the 
exchange may need to allow each 
individual to enter three contracts, 
even though he actually enters only 
one. To see why, remember the 
example above in which everyone 
reported all his trades to the exchange 
except for you and me — we were 
thinking of cheating by not reporting 
our trade. And suppose that you 
would choose to strategically default 
only if you could enter four contracts 
or more, and that if you do not sign 
contracts with an intention to default 
deliberately, your best choice is to sign 
one contract and deliver as promised. 
Now think about the effects 
of different position limits on your 
incentives. If the position limit is 
three and you and I sign a contract 
without reporting it, you will have 
the opportunity to enter a total of 
four contracts. You will do so and 
default on all of them — including 
our contract — so I will insist that 
we report our trade to the exchange. 
Now suppose the position limit is 
lower, say, one. If we don’t report our 
trade, you will have the opportunity to 
enter a total of only two contracts, so 
I am assured you will not strategically 
default. Since I’m not worried that you 
will default on our contract, it makes 
sense for us to trade off the exchange 
and avoid the reporting cost. But this 
means that the position limit was too 
low. The position limit must be high 
enough so that every potential cheater 
stays honest because he knows his 
partner will double-cross him. That is, 
position limits need to be low enough 
to enforce exclusivity, but not too low.14
CONCLUSION
In the first part of this article, 
I explained how dealers can help 
provide liquidity and mentioned some 
of the costs of doing that (the cost of 
holding inventories and the cost of 
asymmetric information). Implicitly, 
the goal was to allow individuals 
to trade as easily and costlessly as 
possible. I also showed that it is not 
obvious what the best way to do that 
is. For example, competition among 
market makers can increase liquidity, 
but in some cases, a monopolist dealer 
can actually provide more liquidity. 
In the second part of this 
article, I showed that liquid markets, 
in which it is very easy to find partners 
for trade, can raise a new sort of 
contractual problem: nonexclusivity. 
In particular, individuals can make 
too many trades relative to their 
capital and subsequently default. 
Then I showed how an exchange 
with a very limited role can overcome 
that problem. In particular, I 
demonstrated that by setting limits 
on reported trades, the exchange can 
make everyone better off — even if 
reporting is voluntary. I also showed 
that sometimes position limits must be 
nonbinding in the sense that traders 
will always choose to trade fewer 
contracts than permitted.
Models like mine may 
be useful in thinking about other 
complicated real-world issues, such 
as the information the exchange 
should reveal to its members regarding 
other members’ trades or the types 
of markets in which it will be most 
valuable to form an exchange.15 Of 
course, an exchange is only one type 
of financial intermediary. Concerns 
about how to enforce contracts with 
nonexclusivity may also be useful for 
thinking about the design of other 
types of financial institutions.
13 You might ask: “How do I know you will 
stop at four contracts? Why not five, or six, or 
more?” My discussion relies on the assumption 
that when two individuals are trying to decide 
whether to cheat by not reporting their trade, 
they simplify their decision-making problem 
by assuming that all other individuals report 
all their trades to the exchange. If I assume 
that everyone else is reporting all trades to the 
exchange, the maximum number of contracts 
you can enter increases by exactly one when you 
and I trade off the exchange. So we basically 
show that if everybody reports all their trades to 
the exchange, no one can gain by not reporting. 
Students of economics (as well as other fields) 
may recognize this as an example of Nash 
equilibrium. (To learn more, read a book on 
game theory, such as those by  Robert Gibbons; 
Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein; or Drew 
Fudenberg and Jean Tirole.)
B R
14 Usually, the concept of Nash equilibrium 
refers to deviations (that is, cheating) by single 
individuals. Here I extend the concept to 
include deviations by pairs of individuals, and 
I add the requirement that deviations by a pair 
of individuals will be self-enforcing, so that no 
individual of a deviating pair will double-cross 
his partner.
15 For example, my model shows that in some 
cases the exchange should not reveal the exact 
number of contracts an individual has entered 
— it should reveal only whether the limit was 
reached. My model also shows that the benefits 
from an exchange are higher when the market 
becomes more liquid or when individuals have 
more intangible capital, such as reputation. 22   Q1  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q1  2004   23 www.phil.frb.org
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